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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
tries has important implications for future actions against former operators
of inactive dump sites. 92 Although Superfund provides money for the emer-
gency cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites, considerable
doubt exists as to the adequacy of the money allocated to Superfund to
complete the cleanup. 93 With the adequacy of the amount of money in
Superfund in question, the EPA's inability to use section 7003 to require
immediate cleanup of inactive dump sites might result in the persistence of
the threatening conditions at abandoned disposal sites over several years,
while the parties adjudicate the ultimate liability for elimination of the
hazard.94 In preserving the applicability of section 7003 to inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Waste Industries provides
important protection for public health and the environment. 95
BARBARA J. TAYLOR
VI. PRISONERS' RIGHTS
Appointment of Counsel: A Fair Trial
for Prisoner Civil Suits
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
right of assistance of counsel to indigent criminal defendants.' The indigent
92. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (implication of Fourth Circuit's decision
in Waste Industries).
93. See 9 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 2085 (1979) (study estimated total cleanup costs for roughly
1,200 improperly managed sites would exceed money allocated to Superfund by at least $10.5
billion). EPA Assistant Administrator Lee Thomas recently estimated the number of hazardous
waste disposal sites eligible for cleanup with Superfund money at 2,200. See 15 ENv'T. REP.
(BNA) 757 (1984). An additional 20,000 sites require investigation. Id. Thomas estimated that
by the end of 1984, the EPA will have obligated one billion dollars of the $1.6 billion available
through Superfund. Id. at 756. By the end of the 1984 congressional session, Congress had not
authorized additional money for Superfund. Id. at 957. Superfund's current authorization
expires at the end of the 1985 fiscal year. Id. at 35.
94. See Wolf, Hazardous Waste Trials & Tribulations, 13 ENVL. L. 367, 382-83 (1983)
(detailing reductions in recent years in EPA's budget for hazardous waste programs).
95. See RCRA's Imminent Hazard Provision, supra note 72, (§ 7003 remains important
weapon for combatting dangers of abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites because cost of
eliminating hazards such sites pose will exceed money allocated to Superfund).
1. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI. Under the sixth amendment, federal courts must appoint
counsel to represent each indigent criminal defendant regardless of the circumstances. See von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 720 (1948) (sixth amendment requires in all criminal proceedings
that federal courts provide counsel to accused who is too poor to secure lawyer); Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941) (court must appoint counsel unless defendant waived right
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civil litigant, however, does not enjoy a similar constitutional right.2 None-
theless, indigent civil litigants may obtain the assistance of counsel under the
federal in forma pauperis statute, section 1915 of Title 26 of the United
States CodeA Section 1915(d) grants the federal courts discretion to request
to counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (determination of whether defendant
intelligently waived right to counsel must depend upon facts and circumstances of case, including
conduct, background, and experience of accused).
The United States Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to state criminal defendants
accused of serious crimes in Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963). In Gideon,
the Supreme Court reviewed cases addressing the sixth amendment right to counsel and the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and noted that a person who is too poor to hire
a lawyer is not assured of a fair trial unless the court appoints counsel to represent the
defendant. Id. at 344. The Gideon Court, therefore, sought to equalize the relative positions of
the government-funded prosecution and the indigent defendant, who is too poor to finance a
vigorous defense. Id. The Supreme Court later held that, absent a defendant's knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, no state may imprison that individual for any offense,
whether petty or felonious, unless the individual was represented by counsel. Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1971). The Argersinger Court observed that although Gideon involved
a defendant charged with a felony, courts should apply the rationale in Gideon to any criminal
proceeding in which an individual's liberty is involved. 407 U.S. at 32. Both Gideon and
Argersinger relied heavily upon the Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama, which held that the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause embodies a right to counsel concept similar to that
found in the sixth amendment. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45; Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70-71 (1932); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Powell Court held that
due process requires the appointment of counsel to ignorant or illiterate defendants in federal
felony cases. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. The Powell Court reasoned that most people require the
aid of a trained lawyer to understand the consequences of criminal proceedings, to make
prudent choices in pleading, and to maintain a viable defense. Id. at 69.
2. See, e.g., Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982) (appointment of counsel in
civil case is privilege and not constitutional right). Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th
Cir. 1971) (there exists no statutory or constitutional right for indigents to have counsel
appointed in civil case). But see Swygert, Should Indigent Civil Litigants in the Federal Courts
Have a Right to Appointed Counsel?, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1267, 1270 (1982) (fundamental
principles of due process and equal protection give indigent plaintiffs right to appointed counsel
in some actions). Judge Swygert contends that the government's failure to provide counsel to
represent indigents constitutes a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Swygert, supra, at 1276. Swygert also believes
the due process clause guarantees appointed counsel to indigent civil plaintiffs seeking to protect
a constitutional or fundamental right, because without the aid of counsel the individual often
will lose important rights. Id. at 1282-83. Swygert, therefore, believes that when indigent civil
plaintiffs bring cases involving constitutional or fundamental rights, they should have a right
to court appointed counsel. Id. at 1301.
3. 27 Stat. 252 (1892) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982)). The pertinent
parts of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 state:
Proceedings in forma pauperis
a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without
prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit
that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor ...
d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ
counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied
that the action is frivolous or malicious.
[Vol. 42:447
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that counsel represent any person financially unable to secure an attorney.4
Courts construing section 1915(d), however, generally have refused to appoint
counsel to indigent civil litigants absent exceptional circumstances.5 In Whis-
enant v. Yuam, 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether the circumstances surrounding an allegation of a delib-
erate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs constituted exceptional
circumstances justifying the appointment of counsel to represent an indigent
prisoner in a civil action.
7
In Whisenant, North Carolina police officers arrested Bobby Whisenant
at a hospital emergency room while the defendant Dr. Yuam, was treating
Whisenant for injuries sustained from a motorcycle accident." The officers
took Whisenant into custody on murder charges even though Whisenant
allegedly complained of vomiting blood and rectal bleeding.9 Whisenant did
not receive further medical attention until his condition became so serious
that a prison official recommended hospitalization. 0 Following Whisenant's
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982).
4. Id. Although § 1915(d) states that a court may "request" an attorney to represent
indigents, courts have interpreted the statute as granting the power to appoint counsel. See
McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir. 1982) (no question that court has discretion
to appoint counsel); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (§ 1915 is express
authority for courts to appoint counsel in civil cases); United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792,
793 (9th Cir. 1965) (§ 1915 specifically authorizes appointment of counsel). But see Reid v.
Charney, 235 F.2d 47, 47 (6th Cir. 1956) (district court only has power to request that attorney
represent indigent plaintiff); see also Bagwell, Procedural Aspects of Prisoner § 1983 and §
2254 Cases in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 95 F.R.D. 435, 443 (1983) (operative word in §
1915 is "request," not "appoint").
5. See Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982) (exceptional circumstances exist
when counsel is necessary to present meritorious issues to court); White v. Walsh, 649 F.2d
560, 563 (8th Cir. 1981) (exceptional circumstances found where appointment of counsel is in
interest of administration of justice); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975)
(prisoner must present meritorious claim before court begins inquiry into existence of exceptional
circumstances); United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1965) (finding of
exceptional circumstances requires exercise of court's discretion); see also Branch v. Cole, 686
F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (although no precise definition of exceptional circumstances exists,
type and complexity of case and relative ability of litigant are controlling considerations).
6. 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984).
7. Id. at 162.
8. Id. In Whisenant v. Yuam, although Whisenant received treatment for a broken
ankle, broken ribs, and broken toes immediately after a motorcycle accident, the injuries
continued to bother him. Id. On July 7, 1981, while Whisenant was seeking medical care from
Dr. Yuam, North Carolina police officers arrested Whisenant for murder. Id. The motorcycle
accident was unrelated to the murders. Brief for Appellant at 2, Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d
160 (4th Cir. 1984).
9. 739 F.2d at 162. In Whisenant, Whisenant testified that he went to the emergency
room because he had vomited blood and suffered from rectal bleeding. Id. The hospital records,
however, did not mention these complaints. Id. The parties also disputed the circumstances of
the arrest. Id. Whisenant alleged that Dr. Yuam only grunted when the officers asked the
doctor if Whisenant could be taken into custody. Id. Dr. Yuam stated, however, that he
specifically permitted the officers to remove Whisenant from the hospital. Id.
10. Id. In Whisenant, Whisenant testified that he complained of internal bleeding to the
officers from the time of arrest until his incarceration in the Burke County Jail. Id. The jailer
1985]
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convictions on first and second degree murder," Whisenant commenced a
civil suit in the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.' 2 Whisenant alleged
that nine state officials and two hospital administrators violated his consti-
tutional rights by providing him with inadequate medical care.' 3 Whisenant
subsequently requested that the district court appoint counsel to represent
him.' 4 The district court refused to appoint counsel because of a lack of
federal funding for attorney's fees.' 5 Whisenant thereafter continued the suit
pro se from his jail cell.' 6 After the jury returned a verdict for the defendants,
Whisenant appealed the district court's denial of appointment of counsel
and the correctness of certain jury instructions. 7 The defendants also ap-
pealed, contending that the district court incorrectly denied their motion for
a directed verdict.'
8
The Fourth Circuit in Whisenant reversed the district court's decision
and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court abused
its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel to represent Whisenant.' 9 The
Whisenant court noted that although the appointment of counsel in civil
cases is discretionary, a court should appoint counsel when an indigent
plaintiff demonstrates the existence of exceptional circumstances. 20 The Fourth
did not record such a complaint until 4:25 a.m., on July 8th, some eleven hours after the arrest.
Id. That afternoon, the prison doctor informed the chief jailer that Whisenant should be
hospitalized. Id. Ostensibly for security reasons, the chief jailer and sheriff transferred Whisenant
to the Salisbury prison unit, some seventy miles away. Id. At 2:00 a.m. on July 9th, the sheriff's
department transferred Whisenant by ambulance to the North Carolina Central Prison Hospital
at Raleigh. Id. Whisenant remained in intensive care for eight days after receiving eleven units
of blood. Id.
11. See State v. Whisenant, 308 N.C. 791, 303 S.E.2d 784 (1983). In State v. Whisenant,
a Burke County Superior Court jury convicted Whisenant of first and second degree murder in
the slaying of a man and his housekeeper. Id. at 792, 303 S.E.2d at 784. Whisenant appealed
his convictions on the grounds that the prosecutor asked improper questions during cross-
examination and that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to comment on evidence
outside the record. Id. at 795, 303 S.E.2d at 785. The North Carolina Supreme Court found
no error in the trial and affirmed the convictions. Id. at 798, 303 S.E.2d at 788.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides that any person, acting under the
authority of state law, who deprives another of any rights secured by the Constitution is liable
to that person for money damages. Id.
13. 739 F.2d at 161-62. In Whisenant, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants' delay in
providing him with medical attention constituted a deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs and thus violated his rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 162; see
U.S. Co~sTr. amend. XIV (states shall not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law).
14. 739 F.2d at 162.
15. Id. at 162-63.
16. Id. at 161-62.
17. Id.; see infra note 44 and accompanying text (district court incorrectly instructed jury
that Whisenant must prove defendants intended to punish him by delaying medical care).
18. Id. at 162.
19. Id. at 163-64; see infra text accompanying notes 22-24 (Fourth Circuit's explanation
of existence of exceptional circumstances in Whisenant).
20. 739 F.2d at 163; see Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975) (court should
[Vol. 42:447
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Circuit further noted that the existence of exceptional circumstances is
dependent upon the type and complexity of the case and the relative abilities
of the individual requesting the appointment of counsel. 2' In concluding that
Whisenant presented exceptional circumstances justifying the appointment
of counsel, the Whisenant court stated that Whisenant's allegation of a
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs presented a meritorious
claim. 22 The Fourth Circuit stated that evidence existed indicating that
Whisenant suffered from oral and rectal bleeding and that Whisenant did
not receive timely medical attention.23 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit
determined that Whisenant did not possess the ability to litigate the complex
civil rights case because Whisenant was uneducated and could not effectively
cross-examine the defendants to challenge their credibility.24 Furthermore,
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Whisenant could not leave prison to
question witnesses and obtain information favorable to his claim.25 The
Whisenant court consequently determined that the district court's refusal to
appoint counsel because of an unavailability of federal funding for attorney's
fees denied Whisenant a fair trial. 26 The Fourth Circuit thus held that the
facts surrounding Whisenant's case constituted exceptional circumstances
which required the appointment of counsel. 27
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Whisenant is consistent with decisions
of several other circuits s.2 Courts have considered many factors in determin-
ing whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify the appointment of
counsel to represent an indigent prisoner in civil litigation. 29 The threshold
question is whether the plaintiff's allegations establish a meritorious claim.30
appoint counsel to represent indigent plaintiff presenting exceptional circumstances).





26. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Whisenant stated that the availability of funding for attorney
compensation is wholly unrelated to the issue of whether a litigant will receive a fair trial
without the appointment of counsel. Id. at 163-64. The Whisenant court noted that the bar has
a duty to accept court appointments on behalf of indigents and emphasized the possibility of
attorney's fees in civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. at 164; see 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1982) (§ 1988 grants court discretion to award prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees).
27. 739 F.2d at 164.
28. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (discussion of factors courts consider in
determining whether to appoint counsel).
29. See, e.g., Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982) (appointment of
counsel to represent indigent prisoners justified only under exceptional circumstances); White
v. Walsh, 649 F.2d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 1981) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) requires appointment of
counsel to represent indigent prisoners only when circumstances justify appointment). No
satisfactory definition of what constitutes exceptional circumstances exists. See supra note 5
(courts have not explicitly defined "exceptional circumstances"). Nonetheless, courts consider
several factors in determining the existence of exceptional circumstances. See infra notes 30-33
and accompanying text (courts consider nature of claim and plaintiff's ability to litigate suit in
determining existence of exceptional circumstances).
30. Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1981). The Maclin court stated that an
19851
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If a court finds that a plaintiff has presented a meritorious claim, the courts
then consider the type and complexity of the case,3 the plaintiff's ability to
investigate the facts of his case, 32 the necessity of cross-examination,33 and
the plaintiff's ability to litigate the case.
3 4
The United States Supreme Court, in Estelle v. Gamble,35 established
the criteria for determining whether a prisoner alleges a meritorious claim
against state officials for failure to provide adequate medical care.3 6 In
Estelle, the Supreme Court held that prison officials' deliberate indifference
to a prisoner's serious medical needs subjected the prisoner to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.3 7 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the deliberate
indifference standard in Maclin v. Freakel8 to determine whether a prisoner's
complaint alleging a deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
indigent prisoner must allege facts constituting a meritorious claim to justify the appointment
of counsel. Id. Even when the claim is not frivolous, however, a court may decline to appoint
counsel if there is little chance for the plaintiff to prevail in the case. Id.
An indigent litigant, however, must satisfy the statutory requirements of § 1915(d) before
a court will inquire into the existence of exceptional circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) (1982)
(applicant must prove indigency and present case that is not frivolous or malicious). Section
1915(d) does not define what constitutes a frivolous or malicious claim, so the trial court must
assess the complaint in light of the facts presented and applicable law. Watson v. Ault, 525
F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R. FED. 679 (1981) (discussion of
standards for determining frivolity under § 1915(d)).
31. Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (appointment of counsel generally
depends upon type and complexity of case and practical abilities of person bringing suit).
32. See McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 1982) (court should appoint
counsel when plaintiff is unable to investigate crucial facts).
33. See Manning v. Lockhart, 623 F.2d 536, 540 (8th Cir. 1980) (appointment of counsel
is justified when witness credibility is determinative of outcome of case and when case presents
serious questions of fact).
34. See Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 1983) (court must determine
whether litigant is capable of presenting his own case).
35. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
36. Id. at 101-06.
37. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (eighth amendment prohibits punish-
ment grossly disproportionate to the crime committed); U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII (federal
government shall not inflict cruel and unusual punishment on prisoners). In Estelle, Gamble
received a back injury when a 600 pound bale of cotton fell on him while he was unloading a
truck. 429 U.S. at 99. A prison doctor prescribed muscle relaxants and ordered Gamble to
remain in his cell. Id. After two months of rest and treatment, the medical staff certified
Gamble as being fit for light work, but Gamble continued to complain of pains in his back and
arms. Id. at 100. The prison disciplinary committee placed Gamble in administrative segregation
and solitary confinement when he refused to work. Id. at 101. Gamble thereafter brought an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the prison staff subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment by their improper care of his injuries. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The Estelle
Court held that prison officials violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment when the officials demonstrate a deliberate indifference to a prisoner's
serious medical needs. 429 U.S. at 104. Improper medical treatment, delay in care, or the
intentional interference with prescribed treatment may constitute such indifference. Id. at 104-
05. The Fourth Circuit extended the Estelle holding to pretrial detainees. See Loe v. Armistead,
582 F.2d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1979).
38. 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 42:447
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
justified the appointment of counsel under section 1915(d). 39 In Maclin, a
prisoner alleged that the prison doctor denied the prisoner proper medical
attention in violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.40 Maclin, a paraplegic, stated that the doctor refused
to provide him with necessary physical therapy and would not provide him
with medication to alleviate the pain attributable to Maclin's paralysis. 4' The
Seventh Circuit, noting that Maclin had not received physical therapy since
his incarceration, concluded that the allegations formed the basis for a claim
that the doctor had exhibited a deliberate indifference to Maclin's serious
medical needs. 42 The Maclin court, therefore, determined that the district
court should have appointed counsel to represent Maclin because he presented
a meritorious claim and, additionally, because Maclin could not investigate
the facts of his case and could not litigate the case successfully without the
aid of counsel. 43 In light of Estelle and Maclin, therefore, the Whisenant
court properly concluded that Whisenant presented a colorable claim justi-
fying the appointment of counsel because Whisenant alleged facts indicating
that the defendants displayed a deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs by the defendants' purposeful delay in providing Whisenant with
proper medical care."4
In assessing the existence of exceptional circumstances in Whisenant, the
Fourth Circuit implicitly recognized that Whisenant could not adequately
39. Id. at 886.
40. Id.
41. Id. In Maclin, paralysis confined Maclin to a wheelchair. Id. Maclin requested that
the defendant, Dr. Freake, prescribe valium or percodan to relieve the pain and muscle spasms
attributable to Maclin's paralysis. Id. The defendant instead ordered substitute medication,
which caused serious side effects. Id. Maclin further asserted that the defendant's refusal to
provide any physical therapy resulted in further debilitation of Maclin's legs. Id.
42. Id. at 889. In Maclin, the Seventh Circuit held that Maclin presented a colorable
claim because he was a paraplegic and the evidence clearly indicated that Dr. Freake had made
no attempts to provide Maclin with physical therapy. Id. Maclin's complaint, therefore, stated
a cognizable claim which, if substantiated, would prove that Dr. Freake exhibited a deliberate
indifference to Maclin's serious medical needs. Id.
43. Id. In Maclin, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case for appointment
of counsel and a new trial. Id.
44. 739 F.2d at 163. In Whisenant, the Fourth Circuit observed that the evidence indicated
that Whisenant did suffer from oral and rectal bleeding. Id. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
determined that Whisenant's charge that the defendants displayed a deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs was not frivolous because Whisenant's required life-saving treatment
upon arrival at the local hospital. Id.
The Whisenant court also concluded that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury
that Whisenant had to prove that the defendants delayed medical care for the express purpose
of punishing him. Id. at 164. Rather, Whisenant was entitled to prevail if he could prove that
the denial of timely medical attention was not related to a legitimate purpose or that defendants
exhibited an intent to punish. Id.; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979) (pretrial
detainee's due process rights are violated if officials impose challenged practice to punish
detainees or if practice does not bear a reasonable relation to legitimate governmental purpose).
The Fourth Circuit stated that no proper governmental purpose existed to legitimize the denial
of medical care where, as in Whisenant, the need for such care was apparent. 739 F.2d at 164.
19851
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
present a complex claim based upon an allegation of a deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs without the aid of counsel. 45 Sirmilarly, in Merritt
v. Faulkner,46 the Seventh Circuit considered whether an allegation that
prison officials displayed a deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious
medical needs constituted the type of case requiring the appointment of
counsel.47 In Merritt, the prison opthamologist diagnosed Merritt as suffering
from a hemorrhage in his left eye. 4 The doctor, however, did not prescribe
any corrective treatment until five months after the initial diagnosis. 49 After
becoming functionally blind, Merritt filed suit alleging that the delay in
medical treatment violated his rights under the eighth amendment. 0 The
Seventh Circuit, in reversing the district court's refusal to appoint counsel,
stated that the allegation of deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical
needs was too complex for lay representation.5 1 The Merritt court concluded
that the district court should have appointed counsel to represent Merritt
because the issue of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs rested
upon the subtleties of legal causation and the duties imposed on prison
officials by the eighth and fourteenth amendments.5 2 Furthermore, the
Seventh Circuit noted that the case presented other exceptional circumstances
because Merritt had proven a meritorious claim, he was unable to investigate
the case, and because Merritt did not possess skills necessary to litigate his
claim without legal assistance.5 3 In accordance with Merritt, therefore, the
Fourth Circuit properly determined that an allegation of a deliberate indif-
ference to a prisoner's serious medical needs constitutes the type of cases
which may justify the appointment of counsel to represent an indigent
prisoner.
5 4
The Whisenant court also considered the prisoner's ability to investigate
the facts of his case, and noted that Whisenant could not leave prison to
question witnesses.5 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has concluded that a prisoner's incarceration guaranteed his inability
45. 739 F.2d at 163.
46. 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 434 (1983).
47. Id. at 762.
48. Id.
49. Id. In Merritt, although the prison opthamologist diagnosed Merritt as bleeding in his
left eye, the doctor delayed treatment to determine whether Merritt also suffered from sickle
cell anemia. Id. The Seventh Circuit further noted that another prison physician described the
delay in treatment as unusual. Id. The prison medical staff, six months after the opthamologist's
diagnosis, sent Merritt to a private hospital for treatment of the injured left eye. Id. The
surgeons, however, erroneously performed corrective surgery on Merritt's right eye, which
eventually resulted in functional blindness in both eyes. Id.
50. Id. at 762-63; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (federal government shall not impose
cruel or unusual punishment).
51. 697 F.2d at 765.
52. Id.
53. Id.




to investigate and obtain evidence favorable to the case.5 6 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit has observed that a prisoner cannot realistically investigate
his claim, conduct discovery, or interview witnesses.17 The Seventh and
Eighth Circuit decisions suggest that circumstances like those in Whisenant,
in which incarceration prevents a prisoner from adequately investigating his
case, requires the appointment of counsel. 8
The Fourth Circuit also noted that discrepancies in testimony and the
need for effective cross-examination necessitated the appointment of counsel
to represent Whisenant.5 9 This determination is consistent with Manning v.
Lockhart,60 in which the Eighth Circuit considered the importance of cross-
examination in determining whether the trial court should have appointed
counsel.6 ' In Manning, the defendant jail warden, Lockhart, accused Man-
ning of committing a burglary while Manning was on work release. 62 Manning
alleged in his complaint that during a private confrontation between Manning
and Lockhart, the warden handcuffed Manning and beat him severely in an
attempt to gain a confession.6 3 The Eighth Circuit, noting that the case
turned on the credibility of Manning and the warden, emphasized the
necessity for cross-examination. 64 The Manning court concluded that counsel
should be appointed when witness credibility is a crucial factor in the case.6 5
Whisenant, like Manning, depended upon witness credibility and required
extensive cross-examination.6 6 Therefore, the Whisenant court's determina-
tion that the district court should have appointed counsel to represent
Whisenant was justified.67
56. See White v. Walsh, 649 F.2d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff prisoner's incarceration
prevents adequate investigation of case).
57. See McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1321 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff prisoner's
failure to conduct discovery and inept investigation of own witnesses indicated prisoner could
not investigate his case).
58. See McKeever, 689 F.2d at 1321 (appointment of counsel proper where prisoner cannot
investigate his claim); White, 649 F.2d at 563 (prisoner's incarceration guarantees his inability
to investigate his case); Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 163 (prisoner unable to investigate his claim
due to imprisonment); see also Rodriguez v. Broglin, 563 F. Supp. 661, 662 (N.D. Ind. 1983)
(appointment of counsel justified where claim requires investigation that applicant is unable to
do himself).
59. 739 F.2d at 163.
60. 623 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 539.
62. Id. at 537. In Manning, the prison warden, Lockhart, assigned Manning to work at
the Little Rock, Arkansas State Police Headquarters. Id. After a burglary occurred in Little
Rock, Lockhart brought Manning back to prison for questioning. Id. During the interrogation,
Lockhart allegedly handcuffed manning and beat him for one hour and forty minutes. Id. at
538.
63. Id. at 538-39.
64. Id. at 538-39. In Manning, the Eighth Circuit noted that witness credibility determined
the result of the case in the district court. Id. at 539. Manning testified that Lockhart beat him
during a private interview, whereas Lockhart asserted that he used no physical force and that
the assistant warden attended the interrogation. Id. at 538.
65. Id. at 540.
66. 739 F.2d at 163.
67. See Manning, 623 F.2d 540 (appointment of counsel necessary when cross-examination
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Furthermore, the Whisenant court acknowledged Whisenant's lack of
education and concluded that Whisenant did not possess sufficient abilities
to litigate the case. 6 In Childs v. Duckworth,69 the Seventh Circuit held that
the district court properly declined to appoint counsel to represent an
articulate prisoner bringing a civil rights case. 70 The Seventh Circuit stated
that the appointment of counsel is appropriate when the prisoner is incapable
of litigating his case, but found that an appraisal of Childs' advocacy skills
revealed that the case could not have been conducted more effectively by an
attorney. 7' Childs, therefore, indicates that the Fourth Circuit properly
considered Whisenant's lack of education as affecting his ability to litigate
his claim and correctly concluded that Whisenant required the aid of coun-
sel. 72
The Fourth Circuit, in Whisenant, held that district courts should appoint
counsel to represent indigent prisoners bringing civil actions that present
exceptional circumstances. 73 The Whisenant court, accordingly, determined
that counsel should be appointed to represent Whisenant because he presented
a meritorious claim, 74 because he could not investigate the facts of his case,
75
and because he did not possess the skills necessary to litigate a complex civil
rights action. 76 The Fourth Circuit, in following the exceptional circumstances
of witnesses is crucial to case); Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 163 (appointment of counsel justified
when witness credibility is decisive factor).
68. 739 F.2d at 163.
69. 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 923. In Childs, Childs held periodic informal discussions on satanism with other
prisoners and without guard interference. Id. at 918. In 1976, Childs asked permission to form
a satanic church at the Indiana State Prison, but the warden denied the request because the
group could not find a proper sponsor. Id. at 919. The warden, Duckworth, also denied Childs'
request for a crystal ball, incense and candles. Id. Childs alleged that the warden's refusal to
provide him with the occult materials and the denial of certification of his religious meetings
violated his first amendment rights. Id. at 918-19. The Seventh Circuit held that the prison did
not violate Childs' first amendment rights of freedom of religion because Childs refused to
provide information about his proposed organization, he never obtained a sponsor, and because
the prison's interest in preserving discipline and security were legitimate state interests. Id. at
921.
71. Id. at 923. In Childs, the Seventh Circuit noted that the facts of the case were
undisputed and the crucial issues were well within Childs' personal knowledge. Id. The Childs
court particularly emphasized that Childs possessed oratory skills comparable to that of an
attorney. Id.
72. 739 F.2d at 163.
73. Id. at 163-64. In Whisenant, the Fourth Circuit stated that the district court's failure
to appoint counsel to represent Whisenant denied him a fundamentally fair trial. Id. at 163.
The Whisenant court further concluded that the availability of federal funding for attorney's
fees is unrelated to the issue of whether a person received a fair trial. Id. at 164.
74. See text accompanying note 22 (plaintiff in Whisenant presented meritorious claim);
notes 37-43 and accompanying text (appointment of counsel justified where prisoner presents
meritorious claim).
75. See text accompanying note 25 (plaintiff in Whisenant could not leave prison to
question witnesses); notes 55-59 and accompanying text (court should appoint counsel where
incarceration prevents investigation of case).
76. See text accompanying note 24 (plaintiff's lack of education in Whisenant precludes
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